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Abstract: Throughout history chemists have faced the accusation of ‘playing 
God’ or similar devilish associations, overshadowing all moral judgments of 
chemistry. The paper provides an ethical analysis of the accusation with focus 
on Craig Venter’s 2010 announcement of having produced the ‘first self-
replicating cell’. Against the deeper historical background of the ambitious 
projects that came to be known as ‘synthetic biology’, I describe Venter’s ac-
tual research and its international media reception. Then I analyze both the 
ethical and theological implications of creating living beings in the laboratory. 
In conclusion I argue that the Venter case, like many others cases from chem-
istry before, is a case of unfortunate science-public interaction that mislead 
both ethics and science. 
Keywords: ethics of chemistry, synthetic biology, artificial life, playing God, pub-
lic image of chemistry. 
1. Introduction 
Chemists working on apparently innocent research projects might be sur-
prised if not puzzled when they suddenly face the public accusation of ‘play-
ing God’. They probably think: ‘I am just doing good science for the benefit 
of society. How is that related to religion? Why should that be bad?’ 
 Much more than any other science, chemistry carries a heritage of reli-
gious presumption and hubris continuing over 2,000 years. Responsible 
chemists should be particularly aware of their cultural history, cautious about 
societal provocations and pitfalls, and versed in ethics. 
 In the Christian tradition, the accusation of ‘playing God’ was originally 
applied to the ‘Fallen Angels’ who would later be called devils under the lead-
ership of Satan. The Book of Enoch, an Apocrypha of the Old Testament 
written around 300 BC by a Jewish sect in Ethiopia, narrates the story of a 
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conspiracy of a group of angels who disobeyed the commands of God and 
traveled down to Earth in order to mate with human females and build their 
own reign, in this sense ‘playing God’.1 The worst crime they committed was 
revealing to women certain secret crafts, in particular metallurgy and the 
production of pigments, dyes, and colored stones (glasses). These crafts, 
which all involve chemical transformations, were secret because they em-
ployed knowledge of the ‘Primordial Creation’. At the time the text was 
written, they were actually developed in Alexandria and became the starting 
point of what was later called alchemy. 
 The story or myth is remarkable in several regards. First, it explains the 
origin of human technology through the impact of evil forces. Second, it 
relates what we would today call chemistry to the divine knowledge of the 
‘Primordial Creation’ and declares it particularly forbidden. Finally, it is the 
founding myth of the devil, whom Christianity and Islam, unlike Judaism, 
incorporated in their theology. In some sense, the invention of the devil was 
the oldest critique of chemistry. 
 Chemical crafts, alchemy, and eventually chemistry would never get rid of 
their devilish association in Christian culture and thereby of the accusation of 
‘playing God’ in the sense of changing or imitating the divine creation with 
the help of demonic forces.2 There are numerous cases similar to the one 
discussed in this paper, such that this theme has overshadowed all public 
moral judgment of chemistry.  
 For instance, church father Tertullian in around 200 CE argued that the 
dying of wool is against God’s will and an association with Satan because 
God had not made colored sheep in the Primordial Creation. Note that he 
did not argue against weaving because God had not made sheep with woven 
wool. Instead the general argument, which has ever since been directed 
against new technologies, applies to essential transformations only. Chemical 
transformations with their radical changes of material properties, which 
transcend ordinary experience and are so difficult to explain, have played a 
central role. Those who tried to change the Creation, that is to produce 
something ‘unnatural’ as it was later called, assumed the role of the Creator 
God, either alone or with satanic help. In alchemy, every ‘unnatural’ chemical 
transformation, be it in metallurgy or for the production of medicines or 
other uses, was suspected to involve demonic forces. Therefore alchemists, 
up to the 18th century, felt obliged to explain their successful work as a ‘gift 
of God’ or a process helped by good angelic forces (Karpenko 1998). 
 Nonetheless, from the 14th century onwards, alchemy became the target 
of critique by many famous European writers (including Petrarch, Chaucer, 
Erasmus) and artists (including Dürer, Brueghel, Teniers), modifying the 
demonic myth.3 Whether in writing or in painting, they all produced varia-
tions of the same theme: a man is tempted by a fiendish alchemist into prac-
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ticing alchemy, becomes obsessed with his work, and eventually ruins his life. 
In paintings, the obsessed or mad alchemist was usually depicted with worn 
clothes, disheveled hair, and surrounded by a mass of alchemical laboratory 
equipment. During the 19th century, writers such as Mary Shelley, Balzac, 
Dumas, and Hawthorne transformed the ‘mad alchemist’ into the ‘mad scien-
tist’, who as a rule was then a chemist or a physician performing chemical 
experiments. While the ‘mad alchemist’ was generally unsuccessful in his 
work, the ‘mad scientist’ is at first glance successful, but eventually fails ei-
ther because his work gains uncontrolled and unforeseen momentum or be-
cause he has morally perverted ambitions that end in self-destruction. 
Eventually Hollywood’s movie makers were so fond of the topic that they 
produced hundreds of variations, drawing on the late medieval imagery of the 
‘mad alchemist’ that was first set in motion picture in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis 
(1927). Since then, a chemical laboratory with various types of glassware is in 
public culture firmly associated with demonic work. 
 In the literary and artistic traditions the fabrication of simple biological 
organisms played little role, for reasons explained in Section 2.1.4 Instead, the 
creation of human or human-like beings figured prominently, from Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein (featuring a mad chemist) to Wells’ Doctor Moreau 
(featuring a mad physician). They drew on earlier literary works or myths, 
such as the Jewish Golem legend and folktales about the alchemical fabrica-
tion of a homunculus (Newman 2004). Among all life forms it was only the 
creation of human life that was at stake and rose the accusation of playing 
God. 
 As will be shown in Section 2, only in the 20th centuary did chemists’ 
scientific fascination and the public’s moral excitement about the creation of 
life begin. That culminated in Craig Venter’s announcement of having fabri-
cated the first artificial cell in 2010, and a worldwide media response of ‘play-
ing God’, which echoed critiques of chemistry for more than two thousand 
years. Section 3 conducts an ethical analysis of that case and the ambitions of 
synthetic biologists to create life, before I draw general conclusions about 
unfortunate science-public interactions that have provoked the accusation of 
‘playing God’. 
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2. From Spontaneous Generation to Synthetic Biology 
2.1 The spontaneous generation and artful creation of life in 
early history 
For most parts of the history, and probably in all cultures, the spontaneous 
generation of simple living beings from inanimate matter was considered a 
banality by most people.5 Whenever some dirt and moisture was incidentally 
or intentionally mixed together, mold, worms, flies, lice, etc. emerged. Be-
cause nobody liked those creatures, they would blame the inadvertency of 
people who made that vermin, instead of accusing them of ‘playing God’. 
 There was thus ample evidence of spontaneous generation in ordinary life. 
Also many Holy Scriptures describe it. For instance, in Exodus 8 of Judaism 
and Christianity, frogs and mosquitos are skillfully produced as plagues 
against the Egyptians. The Hindu Laws of Manu (I, 45) divides all living be-
ings into five groups according to their origin, one of which is characterized 
by their spontaneous emergence out of warmth and moisture. Many ancient 
Greek natural philosophers expressed their views on which elements are nec-
essary for the creation of life. Aristotle even provided a detailed description 
and explanation of the generation of testaceae.  
 In the first-century BC textbook on agriculture, the Roman writer Virgil 
laid down the principles of bugonia, the art of creating honey bees. To illus-
trate how those views flourished among educated churchmen, I translate 
from the German Conrad von Megenburg’s Book of Nature (ca. 1350): 
Bees emerge out of the bellies of young cows [...]. You need to cover the bel-
lies with muck to get bees. Bees also generate from the buried skin of oxen; 
wasps from the skins of donkeys; Worms out of the muck of pigs; frogs out of 
turnips or chard; horseflies out of bad air or rotten breath [...]. From the body 
of dead horses you get wasps and hornets, from the body of donkeys you get a 
kind of flies called glow worms [...]. Note that the bees that generate from 
cows propagate, and that their offspring are of similar kind as real bees. 
The most detailed early-modern technical description of generating plants 
and animals, of cross-breeding and improving them for human purposes, is 
the widely read second edition of Magiae Naturalis (1589) by the Italian 
Giambattista della Porta (1535-1615). Unlike the first edition it passed Ro-
man censorship without problems, even though it now included a new part 
on cross-breeding animals, including the production of human-animal hy-
brids, and techniques for determining the sex of human offspring. One gen-
eration later, the English Lord Chancelor Francis Bacon transformed in his 
utopia New Atlantis (1623) della Porta’s material into a grand systematic 
research project of improving living nature, from basic living beings made 
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from the optimized composition of inanimate matter to perfecting human 
nature. Influential as Bacon’s program still is nowadays – from synthetic 
biology to transhumanism – it then faced neither ethical nor religious criti-
cism. 
 Religious objections against the idea of creating life in the laboratory 
arose only after the acceptance of 19th-century theories of evolution, from 
Lamarck to Darwin. If humans have ultimately emerged through evolution-
ary processes from simple living beings, the first creation of those beings 
would potentially produce humans, and thus the laboratory work would have 
to be considered comparable to divine creation. That critique was forcefully 
voiced by the French catholic chemist Louis Pasteur (1822-1895), who exper-
imentally worked hard on refusing the possibility of spontaneous generation, 
in a famous speech of 1864 before the political and intellectual elite of 
France:  
What a triumph, gentlemen, it would be for materialism if it could affirm that 
it rests on the established fact of matter organizing itself, taking on life of it-
self; matter which has in it all known forces! […] What good then would it be 
to resort to the idea of primordial creation, before which mystery it is neces-
sary to bow? Of what use then would be the idea of a Creator-God? [quoted 
from Geison 1995, p. 111]. 
Suddenly the question of spontaneous generation (and intentional creation) 
of life, which had been considered a banality for millennia, became a religious 
issue. 
2.2 Chemical ambitions in the 20th century 
Scientists, who used to think that all natural phenomena have a natural cause, 
continued to believe in spontaneous generation, both at the historical origin 
of life and in the laboratory under suitable conditions. However by the end 
of the 19th century all presumed incidences of spontaneous generation had 
been found to be caused by spores or germs of microorganisms. Moreover, 
organic chemists had isolated and structurally described a wealth of diverse 
compounds in biological organisms, many of which were stereoisomers, 
which proved the chemical complexity of even the simplest life form. 
 Starting with Nobel laureate Emil Fischer (1852-1919), organic chemistry 
took a new systematic and visionary approach.6 Nowadays he is well known 
for the structure elucidation of sugars, which he achieved without any spec-
troscopic means by using the controlled re-synthesis of the natural products 
and their chemical modification. Rather than just focusing on the naturally 
produced, he developed a classification of all possible sugars as well as a syn-
thetic repertoire to produce them, in order to find sugars with new or more 
useful properties, for instance sugars with higher sweetness or as substitutes 
154 Joachim Schummer 
 
for diabetics. He applied the same strategy to purines (which includes the 
nucleobases of DNA and RNA as well as many alkaloids), to amino acids, 
and small peptides.  
 In the footsteps of Francis Bacon and always eager to collaborate with 
biologists, Fischer in 1890 envisioned the chemical modification of organisms 
far beyond the possibilities of breeding and cross-breeding, what a century 
later would be called metabolic engineering and eventually synthetic biology. 
For instance, the chemically modified organisms should be able to digest 
artificial sugars and to produce out of them, with their modified metabolism, 
new kinds of fatty acids and proteins with desired properties. In 1915 he first 
called that approach ‘chemically synthetic biology’.7 Furthermore, in an un-
published lecture delivered to his working group in 1907, he predicted that 
chemists would soon be able to create life from scratch in the laboratory. 
With a strange sense of humor, he added that one day chemists would also be 
able to create humans, including chemistry professors, so that his own pro-
fession would eventually become obsolete. 
 In the following decades many scientists claimed the imminent life crea-
tion through public announcements, for instance the physiologist and presi-
dent of the British Association for the Advancement of Science Edward A. 
Schaefer (in 1912), the physicists Oliver Lodge (in 1923) and Paul Renno 
Heyl (in 1930), and the chemistry Nobel laureates Theodor Svedberg (in 
1937) and Glenn T. Seaborg (in 1965). The nuclear chemist Seaborg even 
asserted that it would be achieved within a couple of years. 
 In his Presidential Address of the American Chemical Society of 1965, 
Charles C. Price (1913-2001), a physical organic chemist, demanded that 
“synthesis of life should be a national goal” for chemistry, similar to the pres-
tigious well-funded grand projects of physics during the Cold War (nuclear 
energy, radar, weapons, and space exploration). Optimistically he proclaimed: 
“The job can be done – it is merely a matter of time and money”. The “eco-
nomic consequences of such a breakthrough would dwarf those of either 
atomic energy or the space program. Success could lead to modified plants 
and algae for synthesis of foods, fibers, and antibiotics, to improved growth 
or properties of plants and animals, or even to improved characteristics for 
man himself.” (Price 1965, p. 91) 
 The most visionary and ambitious 20th-century prophet was the British 
physical chemist James Frederic Danielli (1911-1984), who after his emigra-
tion to the US turned for a while to microbiology. In 1970 he hit the head-
lines for the first time announcing ‘the first synthetic cell’ that he had 
produced by recomposing the nucleus, membrane and cytoplasm of three 
different amoebae into one new organism. A few days after that rather trivial 
experiment he was again cited in the media, claiming that such work is dan-
gerous and should be controlled by the government – thereby inventing mor-
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al alarmism as PR for science. Soon he became a spokesman for ‘synthetic 
biology’, as he first called the then evolving field of genetic engineering and 
molecular biology in 1975. He also created the by now standard rhetoric of 
the field, according to which biology would follow the model of chemistry 
turning from an analytical period of understanding to an synthetic era of 
making. 
 
Figure 1: The ‘first synthetic cell’ by James Frederic Danielli. 
Danielli’s agenda of Bacon’s program includes virtually everything which four 
decades later the ‘new’ synthetic biology would again promise to achieve. 
Relying on genetic determinism he envisioned the complete synthesis of 
genomes being transferred to host cells, in order to create any desired organ-
ism. Once a minimal organism is created, it could arbitrarily be enhanced for 
food production (e.g., nitrogen fixation, synthesis of essential amino acids or 
desired proteins), cleaning the environment (e.g., waste water treatment, 
heavy metal removal, sea water desalination), energy (e.g. the production of 
oil), medicine (e.g., production of hormones, antibodies, human genes) as 
well as for data storage and processing (modified neurons for biological com-
puting). 
 Furthermore, anticipating the later religious sect of transhumanism, he 
developed an eugenic program for the genetic enhancement of humans. A 
modified genome would produce humans with higher creativity, intelligence, 
longevity, and less aggression. Even more, if one produces a set of genetically 
identical humans, one could conduct better sociological experiments on them 
for the benefit of our knowledge of society. 
 Throughout the 20th century, scientists, and chemists in particular, have 
publicly announced that they soon would be able to create life in the labora-
tory. While this turned out to be wishful thinking, it revealed three important 
aspects of their views. First, because their predictions all turned out to be 
crudely false, their exaggerated views of chemistry’s potential undermined 
their scientific credibility. In fact, hardly any worked in the field, many were 
physical chemists or physicists with apparently only limited knowledge of 
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biology. Second, because the creation of life had in the 19th century turned 
from a banality to a religious issue, it is likely that they all sought public at-
tention for themselves or their profession through their predictions. This is 
further supported by the fact that most of them, I assume intentionally, con-
fused the modification of organisms with the creation of life. Third, in a sur-
prisingly naive way they transgressed the border to science fiction as well as 
moral boundaries by lightheadedly relating the potential fabrication of simple 
life forms to the creation of humans, either for humoristic reasons (Fischer) 
or for eagerly attracting public attention to their science (Price and Danielli). 
In particular, Danielli seemed to have lost any moral sense, not in his scien-
tific work, but in his words that suggested the production of biologically 
identical humans for human experiments. His unbridled ambition to popular-
ize science through its fantastic power made him look like the protagonist of 
a mad-scientist movie from Hollywood. 
 The media reaction was expectable. For instance, the German political 
magazine Der Spiegel (21 December 1970) displayed on its cover page a na-
ked women sitting in an alchemical retort with modern glassware in the fore-
ground and wrote “Biochemistry: The human being is reconstructed”. Its 
cover story was entitled “Biochemistry: Straight to Hell”. 
2.3 The New Synthetic Biology 
At the beginning of the 21st century, two main approaches competed with 
each other for media attention to become the new synthetic biology: proto-
cell research and synthetic genomics. Both drew on many decades of former 
research.8 
 Proto-cell research has its roots in chemical evolution, the study of prebi-
otic conditions on earth that allowed for the stepwise formation of life: from 
simple organic substances and complex biomolecules to organismic struc-
tures and eventually life itself. The classical breakthrough experiment was 
already conducted in 1952. After heating a gaseous mixture of water, hydro-
gen, methane, and ammonium for a week and treating it with electrical 
sparks, Stanley Miller (1930-2007) found a broad spectrum of amino acids as 
well as sugars, lipids, and components of nucleotides. Further experiments 
during the next decade could reproduce the formation of nucleic acids and 
proteins under prebiotic conditions. Studies on the spontaneous formation 
and dynamics of membranes, vesicles, and micelles, which were already pio-
neered by Nobel laureate Irving Langmuir (1881-1957) in the early 20th cen-
tury, added the necessary compartments for organismic metabolism. Since 
RNA had been found to act not only as a carrier of genetic information but 
also as an enzyme that might control its own self-replication, much of the 
research on the chemical origin of life has studied vesicles or micelles filled 
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with RNA plus some other ingredients. The idea is to develop a system that 
shows many or all characteristics associated with life, such as metabolism, 
self-replication, growth, and chemical exchange with the environment. 
 Almost unnoticed the field has moved from understanding the historical 
origin of life under prebiotic conditions to the creation of simple life forms in 
the laboratory under any condition and by any means. Proto-cell research 
distinguishes itself from chemical evolution by emphasizing creation at the 
expense of understanding the origin of life. 
 Synthetic genomics is an ambitious sub-field of genetic engineering. On 
the one hand, it draws on metabolic engineering, i.e. the genetic modification 
of entire protein systems rather than just single proteins, in order to add 
desired functions or to knock out undesired ones in organisms. That is large-
ly the vision of Emil Fischer which has become possible since about the 
1980s. Instead of making bacteria that produce just one new protein, e.g. 
insulin for diabetes treatment, they insert entirely new functions, for in-
stance, a sensor for a chemical stimulus that triggers a color signal, such that 
the bacteria turn red whenever the stimulus is present. Encouraged by ap-
proaches from software engineering, the success depends on whether such 
functions are freely combinable in biological organisms, which is of course 
frequently not the case. On the other hand, synthetic genomics employs the 
entire repertoire of chemically and biochemically synthesizing and multiply-
ing DNA sequences of maximum length and accuracy, ideally of an entire 
genome without any errors. Landmark achievements were the syntheses of 
the genes of the growth hormone somatostatin (1977) and alpha-interferon 
(1981) by Keiichi Itakura and Michael Edge, respectively. Others include the 
syntheses of the entire genomes of the poliovirus with 7,000 base pairs (bp) 
by Eckard Wimmer in 2002, the Spanish influence virus with 13,000 bp by 
Jeffery Taubenberger in 2005, a mycoplasma bacterium with almost 600,000 
bp by Craig Venter’s group in 2008. Combining both strands, synthetic ge-
nomics aspires to design genomes of organisms with any desired function to 
be then synthesized in the laboratory and finally ‘brought to life’. Again, 
synthetic genomics distinguishes itself from traditional genetic and metabolic 
engineering by its emphasis on creating life rather than just modifying exist-
ing organisms. 
 Most synthetic genomicists have, knowingly or not, taken over Danielli’s 
idea of a minimal organism, which includes just enough biological functions 
(and genetic code) for survival under some standard conditions, and on 
which then desired functions should be genetically attached. They aspire to 
reach the minimal organism either by step-wise knocking out of gene se-
quences of some bacteria or yeast or by designing the minimal genome on 
their computer. The two approaches are usually called ‘top-down’ and ‘bot-
tom-up’, but they rather reflect the different methodologies of biologists and 
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software engineers who are both involved. Next we analyze in some detail the 
most famous example. 
2.4 Craig Venter and the Media 
On 20 May 2010 a press release entitled ‘First Self-Replicating Synthetic 
Bacterial Cell’ received worldwide media attention.9 It was issued by the J. 
Craig Venter Institute, a private non-profit genomic research institute in the 
US, founded and directed by biochemist J. Craig Venter. The institute is one 
of the most productive and creative ones worldwide. A forerunner institute, 
Venter’s commercial company Celera, became famous in 2001 for beating the 
international consortium of the Human Genome Project in the race to de-
code the human genome by employing unconventional methods. 
 The three-page press release was comparably rich in scientific detail and 
referred to a research paper published online in Science on the same day (Gib-
son et al. 2010). However its main message was that scientists had achieved 
the goal of synthesizing life in the laboratory. How did the media respond? 
 Not surprisingly, journalists ignored the details and focused solely on the 
main message. Across all levels, from simplistic tabloids to sophisticated 
newspapers, they all joined a worldwide chorus: ‘Craig Venter is playing 
God’. A detailed international analysis of online media reports during the 
following week brought about a surprising geographic pattern according to 
religious predominance. The chorus was dominant in all Catholic, Anglican, 
and Hindu countries. In Austria the religious tone was even reminiscent of 
the former Roman inquisition, relating Venter to witchcraft and the devil. In 
prevailingly protestant areas of Europe, the most popular association was to 
Frankenstein, which is only a pseudo-secular version of accusing somebody 
of aspiring to be Creator. Within Europe only Sweden, Denmark, France, 
and some parts of Switzerland had nuanced reports with little or no religious 
allusion, as in the USA, where national pride was unmistakable. Most Chris-
tian orthodox countries preferred metaphors from Greek mythology for 
uttering critique, like Pandora’s box, except Russia, where the Frankenstein-
motif seems to be popular. Although Judaism and Islam directly or indirectly 
refer to the same creation myth as Christianity, the playing-God motif was 
absent in Israel and Arab countries, notwithstanding harsh criticism from 
Arab commentators. Similarly in China, Japan, and other Buddhist countries, 
where no comparable creation myth exists.  
 A follow-up analysis illustrates how uncorrectable public stereotypes are. 
Through its L’Osservatore Romano, the Vatican immediately issued an official 
statement on the case, acknowledging the work by the Venter team as an 
interesting scientific contribution and rejecting all associations with divine 
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creation. That notwithstanding, several media, incl. ABC News and Associat-
ed Press, titled ‘Church warns cell scientists not to play God’. 
 Let us now have a closer look at what the Venter team actually did and if 
it was justified to describe the work as producing the first synthetic cell. The 
paper in question reported only the final step of a series of work on two spe-
cies of mycoplasma bacteria, let us call them A and B. Mycoplasma bacteria, 
which cause many serious human infections such as peneumonia, are special 
bacteria because they have no cell wall and contain a very small genome of 
only approximately 1 million base pairs. In previous work, the team of 24 
scientists from different countries, had, according to a standard procedure 
known since the 1980s, replaced the genome in species B with that of species 
A to produce a hybrid bacterium. Luckily the hybrid was able to self-
replicate, which is not typically the rule in such hybrid productions. After a 
complete genome analysis of A they had further performed a complete ge-
nome synthesis of A. All of which had previously been published. The final 
step was to repeat the production of the hybrid bacterium, now with the 
synthetic genome, which turned out to be successful. 
 The proper scientific goal of this work consisted not in producing a hy-
brid with a synthetic genome, ‘synthesizing a self-replicating cell’ as the press 
release suggested. Instead, the goal was to prove the accuracy of the complex 
genome synthesis, for which the team had developed several new techniques 
to minimize errors. And the proof of the error-free synthesis was the self-
replication of the hybrid bacterium. In other words, the creation of a self-
replicating cell was not the goal but a means of the scientific work. 
 In press conferences and various media interviews Venter systematically 
misrepresented the work of his team. For instance, he argued that the cell 
was produced out of ‘four bottles of chemicals’. As a matter of fact, the team 
neither produced a cell, nor did they chemically synthesize the genome. They 
actually bought about 1,000 sequences, each of about 1,000 bp, from a com-
mercial DNA-sequence manufacturer who had produced them from enzy-
matically linking smaller parts that were chemically synthesized. Living yeast 
cells then combined them to form longer sequences, first to 100 different 
sequences with each 10,000 bp, then to 10 with each 100,0000 bp, and even-
tually to one with about 1,000,000 bp. 
 Furthermore, the hybrids were not produced by literarily replacing the 
genomes. Instead they mixed synthetic genomes A with cells of species B 
whose membrane were treated with a kind of soap, such that external bodies 
could occasionally slip into the cell (Fig. 2). It very rarely happens then that a 
cell with two different genomes A and B incorporated turns through cell 
division into two cells of which one contains only genome A. If genome A 
has implemented an antibiotic resistance, all B cells and mixed cells can be 
killed by the antibiotic, such that only the hybrid cells survive. From the 
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unsurprising fact that these cells produced proteins similar to species A, the 
team concluded that the hybrids would be of species A.  
 
Figure 2: Schematic representation of the experiment by the 
Venter team. (1) In a mixture of synthetic genomes and sur-
face-treated cells, two cells sometimes merge into one cell that 
contains two natural and one synthetic genome. (2) Natural cell 
division of such a cell sometimes results in two cells, one with 
the synthetic genome alone, the other one with two natural ge-
nomes. (3) If the synthetic genome includes an antibiotic re-
sistance, applying the antibiotic kills all the other cells.  
In their research paper the authors initially described the procedure more 
carefully than in the press release and denied that they had synthetically pro-
duced an artificial cell. Indeed they wrote that it only looks ‘as if’ an artificial 
cell was produced, because they had actually produced only the genome. But 
then they blurred that difference with computer metaphors arguing that the 
‘software’ (genome) would ‘reprogram’ or ‘reboot’ the ‘hardware’ (rest of the 
cell) resulting somehow in an artificial cell. While these metaphors are bio-
logically disputable, it seems clear that they had to hold to some naive form 
of essentialism, according to which the DNA is the essence of life, in order 
to infer the synthesis of the cell from the synthesis of the DNA. 
 The Venter case is an illustrative example of how respectable scientific 
work (here: the almost error-free synthesis of a huge DNA-sequence due to 
sophisticated control techniques) can be turned into public media excitement 
through systematic misrepresentation by the authors themselves: by inten-
tionally mixing up means and ends (self-replicability as a means to prove the 
error free DNA-synthesis), exaggerations (e.g. describing complex biochemi-
cal synthesis in living organisms as simple wet chemical synthesis), confusing 
parts with wholes (DNA and cell), avoiding unwelcome truths (e.g. that ge-
nome replacement is a standard procedure of hybridization rather than cell 
creation), and wrapping up everything in dubious metaphors to hide the con-
fusion.  
 Moreover, in many interviews Venter argued that the experiment would 
challenge our philosophical understanding of life and show that ‘we’ (hu-
mans) are information machines, without any further explanation. Because 
the traditional philosophical understanding of life has largely been about 
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human life, it is not clear how the successful hybridization of closely related 
bacteria can contribute to that. Nor is it clear how the bacteria experiment 
can revive the old information-machine metaphor that had stimulated the 
early days of genetic engineering. However, by relating his pretended bacteria 
creation to human beings through quasi-metaphysical comments, Venter 
could indirectly point to the idea of creating or modifying humans. Such 
allusions are sufficient to create media hype and public excitement because 
they trigger stereotypes that are deeply rooted in Western culture, from the 
homunculus myth that surrounded alchemy to the Frankenstein myth.  
3. Ethical Analysis 
This section provides an ethical analysis, not about synthetic biology in gen-
eral but about its ambition to create artificial life as highlighted in the previ-
ous sections.10 The analysis is confronted with a strange situation that is very 
unusual in current ethics of emerging technologies. Typically research and 
development proceeds much faster than the ethical reflection which is lagging 
behind. In our case, however, the situation seems reverse: Over thousands of 
years before the 19th century, people had believed that life can easily be made 
from inanimate matter and that it had frequently been done so (Section 2.1). 
But nobody had raised any moral or religious objection against that; ethicists 
(and theologians) had simply been disinterested in the matter. Nowadays we 
see stimulated media hype and public moral excitement about the artificial 
creation of life (Section 3.4), although the goal is not yet achieved. The cri-
tique is poorly articulated. As if ethics – i.e. the moral reflection on values, 
norms, obligations, judgments, intentions, virtues, and consequences of ac-
tions – did not exist, a broad public expresses their moral concern, if not 
horror, through the accusation of ‘playing God’.  
 The following subsections look at the artificial creation of life from six 
different ethical angles. The first three approaches are deontological, i.e. they 
judge actions independent of their specific consequences, only according to 
whether they meet or violate certain general obligations. The three corre-
sponding obligations are (1) not ‘playing God’, (2) respecting the dignity of 
life, and (3) reverence or responsibility for life. In contrast, the subsequent 
three approaches, which philosophers call consequentialist positions, judge 
actions only according to whether their consequences are desired or unde-
sired. Particularly they look at three kinds of risks (i.e., undesired and unin-
tended potential consequences): artificial organisms could (4) interfere with 
the ecosphere, (5) be misused as bioweapons, and (6) cause harm to laborato-
ry staff and local environment. 
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3.1 The accusation of playing God 
As we have seen above, the dominant media response in Christian countries 
to scientists who claim or aspire to create an artificial organism in the labora-
tory is the accusation of ‘playing God’. The objection is deeply religious and 
has meaning only within a religious context that includes a divine creator of 
all life. If A accuses B of playing God, A means that B pretends and intends 
to be like God.  
 In the Christian tradition that intention came to be the cardinal or worst 
of all sins, much worse than robbing, raping, child abuse, or murdering. 
Through the story of the fallen angels, who disobeyed God and tried to es-
tablish their own regime on earth, the sin is firmly related to Satan (Section 
1). Thus, accusing somebody of playing God is another way of calling him 
Satan. 
 The religious prohibition of creating artificial life rests on three assump-
tions that are all problematic:  
1. Historical assumption: All life on earth originated from divine creation. 
However, most scientists believe that life originally emerged by chemical 
evolution.  
2. Metaphysical assumption: Every natural organism owes its existence indi-
rectly to divine creation in a way that would be circumvented by human 
life synthesis. However, most theologians, including the Vatican state-
ment cited above, believe that all life originates from God, no matter what 
humans make in their experiments. Matter might originally be imbued 
with the potentiality of life or with sperms that can turn into real life un-
der certain conditions. Church Father Augustine explained spontaneous 
generation in this way already in the fifth century. 
3. Psychological assumption: Scientists who try to create life in the laborato-
ry intend to be like God. However, unless they clearly express such an in-
tention, there is little reason to assume that. Note that the sin does not 
consist in doing something, but in pretending and intending something. If 
the scientist is an atheist, the assumption is plainly wrong. Somebody who 
does not believe in the existence and concept of God can hardly intend to 
be like God. 
Since all three assumptions are problematic, it is difficult to understand how 
the accusation could be meaningfully applied to synthetic biologists by either 
Christians or atheists. It rather originates from a folk religion of an artisan-
like creator God, mixed up with literary myths such as the Frankenstein and 
homunculus stories. However, as the Venter case illustrates, some scientists 
subtly play with that folk myth in order to raise media attention for their 
own research. 
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3.2 Dignity of Life 
A frequent objection against the creation of artificial organisms worries 
about the dignity of life. If life can be synthesized in the laboratory, it is said 
that it would lose its dignity, which is considered a bad thing. The objection 
has been raised throughout the 20th century and recently echoed by many 
critics of synthetic biology. It is worth considering the argument in detail 
because it typically comes with hidden assumptions and conceptual confu-
sion. 
 Note that the argument cannot be applied to individual organisms synthe-
sized in the lab. Because these organisms did not exist and thus could not 
have any dignity before their synthesis, it is logically impossible that they 
would lose their dignity by their creation. In order to make sense of the ar-
gument, we need to reformulate it so that it applies to kinds of organisms: 
‘The knowledge that organisms of a certain kind can be synthesized in the lab 
eliminates their dignity, which is bad.’ 
 There are at least two major problems with the argument. First, it is not 
clear if simple life forms actually bear any dignity and where that would come 
from. In the religious creationist reading, the dignity is endowed by divine 
creation, which is missing in human creation. The argument is then just an-
other version of the playing-God objection that was rejected above (van den 
Belt 2009). In any secular reading, dignity is ascribed by humans through 
appreciation and moral respect. However, today’s wide use of antiseptics and 
antibiotics for killing bacteria without the slightest moral concern suggests 
that humans ascribe no dignity to microorganisms. There is also no historical 
evidence that humans ascribed dignity to basic living beings before the mid-
20th century, when philosophers began to develop related ideas to which we 
will come back in the next section. Starting in the Renaissance, dignity has 
been ascribed solely to human beings in order to establish respect for humans 
and natural human rights. For instance in the Kantian tradition, human digni-
ty rests on the moral freedom of humans, opposed to the causal determina-
tion of other living and non-living nature. 
 It seems that the argument relates the life of basic organisms to human 
life, such that the synthesis of simple life form would affect our understand-
ing of humans and eventually human dignity. Indeed most newspaper com-
mentaries of Venter’s hybrid bacterium, as well as Venter himself, tried to 
establish that relationship – most prominently by the Frankenstein myth. 
That is however both biological and philosophical nonsense. If a simple or-
ganism could be made in the laboratory, that would have no biological impli-
cations about how to make a human. Moreover, philosophical traditions 
derived human dignity from moral and intellectual capacities rather than 
from biological functions that we might share with other organisms. 
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 Second, even if simple life forms had some kind of dignity, the argument 
would not stand ethical scrutiny because it discredits knowledge. Imagine 
somebody ascribing dignity to a bacterium based on the idea that this bacte-
rium cannot artificially be made. Imagine further that scientists find out that 
the idea was wrong, that the bacterium can actually be made. The only rea-
sonable ethical response would be to recognize one’s mistake, that the ascrip-
tion of dignity was based on a wrong assumption. In contrast, the argument 
suggests that such knowledge is bad even if it is true. However, such a posi-
tion that defends dogmas by discrediting knowledge would hardly count as 
an ethical standpoint. 
 If simple life forms can generate from inanimate matter, the natural re-
sponse would be a shift in one’s attitude, as the Scottish biologist John Ar-
thur Thomson already wrote in 1922, “it would increase our appreciation of 
what is often labeled as ‘inert’ matter” (Thomson 1922, vol. 1, p. 62). 
3.3 Biocentric Ethics (1): biological individualism 
For most parts of history, Western ethics was anthropocentric, i.e., humans 
(frequently excluding slaves and women) were the only beings that were 
considered moral objects in moral deliberations. In accordance with the bibli-
cal task that man should rule over Earth (Genesis 1, 28), nonhuman nature, 
both living and nonliving, lacked any intrinsic value and was considered only 
instrumental to human interests as long as it was not eradicated. Only during 
the Enlightenment period the scope of morally relevant objects was extended 
to include higher animals capable of suffering, in particular by Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (1712-1778) in France and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) in Eng-
land. 
 Truly biocentric approaches, which attribute intrinsic values to all living 
beings and appreciate them for their own sake in moral consideration, were 
developed not before the 20th century. Most famously the French-German 
physician and theologian Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) developed his theo-
ry of ‘reverence for life’ for which he was awarded the Peace Nobel Prize in 
1952. He maintained that all living beings – human and nonhuman, including 
pathogenic bacteria (!) – share a ‘will for life’ that establishes in humans the 
moral emotion of respect or reverence as the fundamental basis of ethics. 
Similarly, in his The Imperative of Responsibility (1984), the German philoso-
pher Hans Jonas argued that all living beings have an intrinsic purpose, they 
defend themselves against death and call for protection, from which he de-
rived the fundamental human responsibility for all life.  
 Can we infer from these classical biocentric approaches ethical objections 
against the artificial creation of life? Unlike what one would expect at first 
glance, the answer is a clear No. If the artificial organism meets all the biolog-
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ical criteria for life, as synthetic biologists aspire to achieve, it would deserve 
the same reverence and responsibility as a natural organism. Moreover, if 
living beings unlike inanimate matter have intrinsic value, one could even 
derive the moral obligation to increase that value by turning inanimate matter 
into life. Thus classical biocentric approaches, which focus on the intrinsic 
value of biological individuals, would encourage rather than prohibit the arti-
ficial creation of life. 
3.4 Biocentric Ethics (2): biological holism 
Unlike the previously mentioned approaches of biocentric ethics, which con-
sider biological individuals to have intrinsic values, there is another branch of 
environmental ethics that appreciates the biosphere as a whole, a dynamic 
ecosystem in which individuals only play temporary and exchangeable roles. 
The difference between both positions echoes two extreme views of the hu-
man sphere: individualism (society is an aggregation of independent individu-
als with certain rights) versus socialism (society is a complex holistic system 
composed of the interdependencies between exchangeable individuals).  
 Not surprisingly, biological holism, which is sometimes also called ‘deep 
ecology’ and which can be traced back to early 19th-century romanticism, 
comes with various religious and political flavors, each celebrating its own 
founder. Yet, from a biological point of view it makes perfect sense to look at 
life not as an arbitrary aggregation of individuals, but as a dynamic system, 
both at the local level of ecosystems and the global level of the biosphere. If 
one considers large time scales, the biosphere undergoes evolutionary chang-
es by its own population dynamics as well as by outer impacts such as natural 
disasters and eventually human interference. 
 Biocentric holism, as an ethical approach, ascribes intrinsic values to the 
ecosphere as a dynamic whole and calls for its protection by sustaining vari-
ous characteristics, such as species diversity and adaptive flexibility. The call 
is difficult to justify, though, within a biocentric framework that takes hu-
mans as part of the global ecosphere, because that would allow any human 
interference to count as an acceptable factor of biological evolution. Justifica-
tions therefore include the Christian appeal of human stewardship for nature 
and the anthropocentric appeal that human life depends on its biological 
environment to be sustained for the sake of humans. Whatever the justifica-
tion may be: can we derive from biocentric holism moral constraints on the 
human endeavor of producing artificial organisms? 
 Humans have ever interfered with the biosphere, from agriculture, horti-
culture, forestry, and the breeding and domestication of animals to the use of 
antibiotics, antiseptics, pesticides, and genetic engineering. In some cases, 
biocentric holism provides clear guidance, for instance against large defor-
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estation of rain forests and huge monoculture production of crops upheld by 
massive employment of pesticides, both resulting in vast extinction of bio-
logical species and instable ecosystems. Also genetic engineering can be prob-
lematic if the gene-modified species massively and irreversibly change the 
ecosystem through direct interaction with other species or through gene 
exchange on an evolutionary scale. Even though genetic engineering has em-
ployed from the beginning ‘natural’ enzymatic processes for gene insertion, 
replacement, and modification, the extend of biological gene mobility among 
species has long been underestimated. 
 If the artificial organism is equipped with normal DNA or RNA, the 
problems of genetic engineering will largely repeat. If the DNA or RNA is 
modified, by chemically modified nucleobases or nucleotides, the possible 
genetic interactions with the biological environment are hardly foreseeable. 
If, on the other hand, the artificial organism is composed entirely differently 
than natural organisms, genetic interactions with the environment becomes 
unlikely, but such organism might be able to drive out other organisms and 
thus massively change the ecosystem. To prevent such ‘run-away’ cases, one 
could genetically incorporate an invulnerability that allows killing the artifi-
cial organisms when they might become a biological thread. However, such 
in-built vulnerability is not a handy solution for all cases, as synthetic biolo-
gists sometimes suggest. If the artificial organism is sufficiently similar to 
natural organism, the vulnerability could easily spread to natural species with 
undesired effects on the ecosystem. 
 Despite the shortcomings regarding its ethical foundation, biocentric 
holism can give us some moral guidance for the artificial production of life. 
However, at this point there is hardly more than a rule of thumb: particular 
precaution is due if the artificial organism is neither very similar to nor very 
different from natural organisms.  
3.5 Bioterrorism 
A frequently voiced argument against synthetic biology warns of the misuse 
of dangerous creatures by rogue states or terrorists (e.g., Schmidt 2009). To 
be sure, the argument points to an important risk. However, one should 
evaluate the threat with a sense of realism. 
 It is more than unlikely for several reasons that in the near future some-
body would create a new organism from scratch for malign purposes only. 
First, it is extremely difficult to do, in fact no scientist knows how to do that 
by now. Second, the research and development would be extraordinarily dan-
gerous (see below), which rules out all amateurish endeavors. Third, there are 
many malignant micro-organisms in wild life, like the Ebola virus or Bacillus 
anthracis (anthrax), which could be collected and employed in a much easier 
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and less dangerous way based on long term experience with these infectious 
diseases. Forth, it is much easier to modify existing organisms by standard 
genetic engineering such that they become malignant. If the presumed rogue 
state or terrorist had only the slightest sense of proportion for the required 
effort and the desired effect, they would of course collect or modify natural 
pathogens. 
 Nonetheless, bioterrorism remains a threat, not by new organisms from 
scratch, however, but by classical genetic engineering. Commercial firms 
offer synthetic gene sequences at rapidly decreasing rates, currently for about 
20 US cents per base pair. That makes it cheap and easy to insert into bacteria 
sequences that code for toxins either as plasmids or as parts of the genome. 
 Not because of synthetic biology but because of the rapid decay of prices, 
there is an urgent need for international regulation of gene synthesis compa-
nies, their clients, and orders with regard to pathogenic genes. Thus far, there 
are only some national recommendations and voluntary commitments by 
companies. 
3.6 Risks for laboratory staff and the environment 
Last but not least, the creation of new and the modification of existing mi-
cro-organisms is a high risk for all laboratory staff including the cleaning 
personnel and the local environment. Ethicists frequently ignore that when 
they consider scientific research to be done by the individual researcher who 
might be responsible for his own harm. However, in current laboratory re-
search projects usually dozens of people are involved with different back-
grounds in science and safety instruction.  
 For instance, the synthesis and modification of pathogenic viruses, such 
as the poliovirus and influenza virus, may improve our medical knowledge 
but is at the risk of all people involved, including their social environment. 
Mycoplasma bacteria, which are favorite test organisms in synthetic biology 
because of their lack of a cell wall, are frequently pathogenic and cause chron-
ic infectious diseases, probably for the same reason. When handling sequenc-
es of DNA and RNA for whatever reasons, one should keep in mind that 
these biopolymers can interfere with the genetic material of humans and 
other living beings in hardly predictable ways. 
 When synthesizing a new, hitherto unknown chemical compound, chem-
ists are used to treat it in their laboratory with all precaution, as if it would be 
highly toxic. Even if one has perfect structural knowledge of the compound, 
its effects in complex biological contexts are unpredictable. Much stricter 
safety measures must be applied to research with microorganisms, modified 
or artificial, and all biological material that is capable of replication because 
even the smallest amount could multiply in suitable environments. All exper-
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imental settings need to be strictly double-isolated against both the laborato-
ry and the outer environment. 
 For any such experiments, the research goals should be well balanced 
against the remaining risks for laboratory workers and the surrounding natu-
ral and social environment. One must have good reasons – ones that would 
be morally acceptable in case of an accident – to justify the research. In would 
not help much saying, ‘I just wanted to try something out’.  
4. Conclusion 
The history of life creation and the way people looked at it is more than puz-
zling. For thousands of years it was considered a banality that happened eve-
rywhere, whether intentionally or not; nobody cared about it or raised any 
moral or religious concern. Nowadays it is both an overarching goal for many 
scientists and an outrageous idea for large parts of the public in Christian 
countries. The reversal of views could not be more extreme. What made this 
happen? 
 As pointed out in Section 2.1, evolution theories moved the focus of sci-
entific and moral attention to simple organisms as the potential beginning of 
life, from which human beings would eventually have emerged. However that 
cannot provide a full explanation of the public consternation. Both creation-
ist, who do not believe in evolution, and people in secular societies express a 
similar kind of dismay with the accusation of ‘playing God’ or imitating 
Frankenstein, the ‘modern Prometheus’ as Mary Shelley subtitled her influ-
ential novel. Moreover, as we have seen in Section 3.1, the accusation of 
‘playing God’ has no ethical or theological basis, neither within nor without 
the Christian doctrine. One might instead claim a general shift in the evalua-
tion of life forms during the 20th century supported by environmental 
movements. However, we are talking here mostly about bacteria that are 
invisible to the naked eye and beyond the horizon of most people, although 
about 1014 bacteria live in every human and approximately 5*1030 on Earth 
making up most of the biomass (Whitman et al. 1998). Who would actually 
go as far as Albert Schweitzer and call for reverence to pathogenic microor-
ganisms? 
 It seems more likely that the public dismay about life creation expresses a 
diffuse fear and dismay of science in general, and chemistry in particular, that 
is composed of literary myths epitomized in the mad scientist (Section 1). As 
we have seen in Section 3, however, the public dismay does not stand up to 
ethical scrutiny. None of the three deontological approaches (the obligations 
to not ‘play God’, to not touch the dignity of life, and to reverence and be 
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responsibility for individual organisms) can be used to derive serious objec-
tions. Of course the three consequentialist approaches point to important 
risks (interference with the ecosphere, misuse as bioweapons, and harm to 
laboratory staff and local environment). However these risks of the creation 
of artificial organisms do not essentially differ from, are sometimes even 
minor to, the risk of modifying existing organisms. In sum, it is difficult to 
find any particular ethical substance behind the public dismay expressed in 
phrases like ‘playing God’. 
 Unarticulated as these phrases are, they are extremely powerful in creating 
public moral excitement, with two negative side effects. On the one hand, 
they distract the public from proper ethical deliberations and issues. Because 
they express radical rejection, they undermine any dialogue between science 
and the public. That might even hinder constructive ethical work in which 
scientists and ethicists ideally work together. On the other hand, they mis-
lead science by pushing the creation of life as an end in itself, because that is 
exactly what draws public attention and thereby indirectly research funding. 
Scientists like Price, Danielli, and Venter have been tempted into alluding to 
these phrases, for instance by confusing ‘modification’ with ‘creation’ of life 
and microorganisms with humans. Venter, as we have seen in Section 2.4, 
even went further and systematically misrepresented the research of his team, 
among others by putting the creation of life as the presumed research goal, 
whereas their hybrid bacterium was actually only a means. 
 One might think that this is only PR on the surface and does not touch 
real research. However, several developments suggest that it has also an im-
pact on scientific values. For instance, proto-cell research neglects or even 
gives up the earlier scientific quest for understanding the origin of life in 
favor of making something alive, whatever it is and under whatever condi-
tions (Section 2.3). Thereby the epistemic value of understanding, of know-
ing how and why something happened, is replaced by the technological value 
of knowing how to do something. In synthetic genomics it is also not clear, 
whether the enormous efforts at building an organism from scratch improves 
our scientific understanding of life and its historical origin. The supposed 
epistemological principle of knowing from making, which was once so suc-
cessful in organic chemistry, is difficult to apply to whole biological systems. 
Moreover, it is far from clear whether building an organism from scratch 
would have any technological advantage over the targeted genetic modifica-
tion of existing organisms. Thus the effort might even violate the technologi-
cal value of keeping a reasonable cost-benefit ratio. 
 Finally, unfortunate science-public interactions do serious harm to the 
profession of scientists. As the cases of Danielli and Venter illustrate, the 
literary myths of the fiendish mad scientist, which somehow began with the 
Book of Enoch 2300 years ago, are deeply entrenched in popular culture and 
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can be revived at any time. Minimal allusions suffice to reinforce age-old 
stereotypes. Chemists, due to their special cultural heritage outlined in the 
Section 1, are particularly affected and should meticulously avoid any allu-
sion. If they ignore that, because of lack of knowledge about the cultural 
history or out of selfish desire to be in the focus of public attention, they 
damage the image of science. In the end neither scientists, nor the public, nor 
ethicists are happy. 
Further Reading 
A much more detailed presentation with background information and hun-
dreds of references, which are here omitted for space reasons, is Schummer 
2011, albeit not yet translated into English. More details on Section 2 can be 
found in Schummer 2003, 2006, 2009. There are numerous anthologies on the 
societal and ethical aspects of synthetic biology, from earlier ones such as 
Bedau & Parke 2009, Schmidt et al. 2009 to Boldt 2016, Hagen et al. 2016.  
Notes
 
1 On the following see Schummer 2003. 
2 In the Christian tradition the accusation of ‘playing God’ can have different mean-
ings depending on God’s role as creator (messing with the Creation/Nature), 
moral law-giver (giving oneself own moral laws), or ruler of destiny (controlling 
the course of events). This paper refers only the first meaning. 
3 On the following, see Schummer 2006. 
4 A rare early exception is Theodore Sturgeon’s Microcosmic God (1941), see 
Schummer 2011, pp. 184-186. 
5 On the following, see Lippmann 1933, Farley 1977, Schummer 2009, 2011, chap. 
3. 
6 On the following, see Schummer 2011, chap. 7, on Fischer see also Johnson 2015. 
7 At that time, the term ‘synthetic biology’ was used to mean a holistic approach in 
biology, from which Fischer clearly wished to distinguish himself. 
8 On the following, see Schummer 2011, chap. 8. 
9 On the following, see Schummer 2011, chap. 9. 
10 On the following, see Schummer 2011, chaps. 13, 15. 
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